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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we apply a consensus model to decision-making in committees
that have to choose one or more alternatives from a set of alternatives. The
model does not use a voting rule nor a set of winning coalitions. Every decision
maker evaluates each alternative with respect to given criteria. The criteria may
be of unequal importance to a decision maker. Decision makers may be advised
by a chairman to adjust their preferences, i.e., to change their evaluation of
some alternative(s) or/and the importance of the criteria, in order to obtain
a better consensus. The consensus result should satisfy constraints concerning
the consensus degree and the majority degree. A simple example is presented.
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1 Introduction
Usually, each member in a committee ranks the candidates or alternatives in a
linear ordering and next some voting rule, like Plurality, Majority or Borda, is
used to aggregate the individual rankings into a social ranking. It is well known
that the outcome determined this way is very much dependent on the chosen
aggregation procedure. Depending on the criterium used, also the individual
rankings of the candidates may vary. In Nurmi (2005), the author gives a nice
overview of the aggregation problems in policy evaluation.
These problems are also discussed in Peleg (1984), in which the author gives
a game-theoretic analysis of voting in committees. A committee is defined as
a game G = (N,W ), where N is the set of committee members and W is the
set of winning coalitions. Given a profile RN , alternative x dominates y if
{i ∈ N | xRiy} is winning. Given a profile, the core is the set of undominated
alternatives. The author shows that for a committee G = (N,W ) without veto
players all cores are non-empty if and only if the number of alternatives is smaller
than the Nakamura number of G.
In Laruelle and Valenciano (2005a, 2005b), the authors consider committees
that bargain in search of consensus over a set of feasible agreements under a
voting rule. They specify strict probabilistic bargaining protocols as well as
protocols derived from the voting rules and investigate the stationary subgame
perfect equilibria.
The approach in the present paper is completely different. First of all, the
outcome is not determined by a voting rule nor by a set of winning coalitions.
Instead, the present consensus model uses concepts introduced in Carlsson et
al. (1992). Every decision maker evaluates each alternative with respect to
given criteria, agreed upon in advance. Not only are the alternatives ranked
by each member in a weak order, but also – more precisely and more detailed
– each decision maker i values the different alternatives a with respect to each
criterium c by a real number gi(c, a) such that the sum of gi(c, a) over all
alternatives a equals to 1. The different criteria may be of unequal weight to
a decision maker. Let hi(c) be the weight that committee member i assigns to
criterium c, then we assume that the sum of hi(c) over all criteria c equals to 1.
Based on the evaluations (comparisons) of all alternatives by all decision makers
(taking into account all criteria and their weights for the different committee
members), the Euclidean-like ‘distances’ between decision makers are calculated.
The generalized consensus degree is defined as 1 minus the maximum distance
between two members. In the model a minimum consensus degree is required
in advance. If the computed generalized consensus degree is smaller than the
required one, a procedure of consensus reaching starts in which the chairman
asks at least one decision maker to adjust his preferences.
The model presented in this paper can be explained to a general audience
much easier than the ones mentioned above. Consequently, it is relatively easy
to use this model in applications, in particular since appropriate software for
supporting the decision making is available. The present model is also closer to
practice, since a special role is foreseen for the chairman of the committee. Fi-
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nally, since there is no voting rule involved, the aggregation problems mentioned
above cannot occur.
Section 2 of this paper concerns the formal consensus model. In Subsection
2.1, we introduce the model, while in Subsection 2.2, we compare it with some
other methods proposed in the literature. In Section 3, we apply the consensus
model to the Management Committee of an EU Cost Action. Finally, in Section
4, we conclude.
We do not address here the problem how to elect a committee or how to
form a stable coalition. This problem is addressed among others in Brams et
al. (2003, 2004).
2 The consensus model
2.1 Description of the model
The formal model is as follows. Let N be the set of all decision makers who try
to reach consensus on some alternatives. Let A denote the set of all alternatives.
Let C denote the set of all criteria. Each decision maker is supposed to have an
evaluation of the importance of the criteria. Hence, for each i ∈ N , we assume
hi : C → [0, 1], such that
∀i ∈ N [
∑
c∈C
hi(c) = 1], (1)
where hi(c) is i’s evaluation (or weight) of criterion c. Moreover, for each i ∈ N ,
we also assume gi : C ×A→ [0, 1] such that
∀c ∈ C [
∑
a∈A
gi(c, a) = 1], (2)
where gi(c, a) is the value of alternative a to decision maker i with respect to
criterion c.
In order to determine his evaluations hi(c) of the importance of the different
criteria c and his values gi(c, a) of the different alternatives a with respect to a
given criterion c, decision maker i may use the MacBeth software (Bana e Costa
and Vansnick, 1999; Bana e Costa et al., 2003), which is extremely appropriate
for these purposes. The reasons for preferring the MacBeth method to Saaty’s
Analytical Hierarchy Process (Saaty 1977, 1980) are explained in Bana e Costa
and Vansnick (2001); see also Section 4 for a discussion.
Let (hi(c))c∈C denote the 1× |C| matrix representing the evaluation (com-
parison) of the criteria by decision maker i, and let (gi(c, a))c∈C,a∈A denote the
|C|×| A| matrix containing i’s evaluation (comparison) of all alternatives with
respect to each criterion in C. For each i ∈ N , we define fi : A → [0, 1] such
that
(fi(a))a∈A = (hi(c))c∈C · (gi(c, a))c∈C,a∈A, (3)
where fi(a) is i’s evaluation of alternative a, and (fi(a))a∈A is the 1× |A| matrix
containing i’s evaluation of each alternative.
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The Euclidean-like ‘distances’ between decision makers i and j are calculated
as follows:
d(fi, fj) =
√
1
|A|
∑
a∈A
(fi(a)− fj(a))2. (4)
By (1), (2), and (3), 0 ≤ d(fi, fj) ≤ 1. Let
d∗ = max{d(fi, fj) | i, j ∈ N}. (5)
A generalized consensus degree δ∗ for a committee is defined as
δ∗ = 1− d∗ = 1−max{d(fi, fj) | i, j ∈ N}. (6)
In the model a certain consensus degree δ˜ ∈ (0, 1] is required in advance. We
say that a committee reaches consensus if the constraint δ∗ ≥ δ˜ is satisfied.
In the likely situation that at the first stage no consensus is reached, com-
mittee members are tentatively partitioned according to their rankings of the
alternatives. Each group of this partition is given time to explain and defend its
position. Also, each member may persuade other members to adopt his point
of view. If consequently some members change their mind, the new consensus
degree is calculated. If this is still too small, i.e., less than δ˜, the process of
consensus reaching should be continued. That is why we assume a kind of me-
diator, called the chairman. If the decision makers reach a consensus degree
δ∗ < δ˜, it is the chairman who decides who should adjust his/her preferences in
order to reach a better consensus. He does so in the following way. Let
D∗ = {i ∈ N | ∃j ∈ N [d(fi, fj) = d∗]}. (7)
The chairman selects a decision maker i∗ ∈ D∗ to adjust his/her preferences,
who satisfies the following condition
i∗ = arg min
k∈D∗
d∗−k, (8)
where d∗−k is defined for k ∈ D∗ as
d∗−k = max{d(fi, fj) | i, j ∈ N \ {k}}. (9)
If there are two members satisfying condition (8), the chairman chooses one of
them. The chairman may also give advice to i∗ how to adapt his/her preferences.
The chairman’s advice should always lead to an increase of δ∗. If i∗ refuses to
change his/her preferences, he/she is ‘excluded’ from further discussion.
We assume a majority degree m˜, that is, the minimal number of decision
makers necessary to make a decision. If |N \ {i∗}| ≥ m˜, the remaining decision
makers try to reach consensus. If |N \ {i∗}| < m˜, the committee does not reach
consensus. If i∗ follows the chairman’s advice, then the new generalized con-
sensus degree δ′∗ is calculated, and if δ′∗ ≥ δ˜, the committee reaches consensus.
If δ′∗ < δ˜, then a new decision maker, i′∗, is appointed by the chairman for
adjusting his/her preferences, etc.
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If consensus is reached by the committee, that is, if the constraints concern-
ing the consensus degree and the majority degree are satisfied, a mean consensus
decision is calculated. Let N∗ ⊆ N denote the set of the decision makers who
succeeded in reaching consensus. Assuming that the decision makers might be
unequally ‘important’, we add up the weighted (final) values of the alternatives
to all decision makers from N∗. For each a ∈ A, the weighted value f(a) of
alternative a is defined as
f(a) =
∑
i∈N∗
w′i · fi(a), (10)
where for each i ∈ N∗
w′i =
wi∑
j∈N∗ wj
, (11)
and wi means the ‘weight’ of decision maker i ∈ N∗. The committee chooses the
alternatives with the greatest value of f(a). In particular, if only one alternative
may be chosen, the committee chooses the alternative a∗ such that
a∗ = argmax
a∈A
f(a). (12)
If there are (at least) two alternatives satisfying condition (12), and only one
alternative may be chosen, the chairman decides for one of them.
2.2 Comparing the model with other methods
In the literature, many procedures of choosing one or more alternatives from a
set of available alternatives have been analyzed. In Section 1, we have already
mentioned game-theoretical treatises like the ones by Peleg (1984), and Laruelle
and Valenciano (2005a, 2005b).
In social choice theory, given available alternatives and individual preferen-
ce orderings of the alternatives, an election mechanism can serve to select one
alternative or, if needed, a set of alternatives. An overview and comparison of
several election procedures is presented, for instance, in Brams and Fishburn
(2002), and in de Swart et al. (2003). The most well-known election procedures
are Plurality Rule (Most Votes Count), Majority Rule (Pairwise Comparison),
Borda Rule, and Approval Voting.
Under the Plurality Rule (Most Votes Count), only the first preference of a
voter is considered. An alternative x is collectively preferred to an alternative y
if the number of voters that prefer x most is greater than the number of voters
that prefer y most. Under the Plurality Rule, if one alternative must be chosen,
it will be the alternative which is put first by most voters.
The Majority Rule (Pairwise Comparison) is based on the majority principle
which says that alternative x is collectively preferred to y if x defeats y, i.e., the
number of voters that prefer x to y is greater than the number of voters that
prefer y to x. If there is an alternative that defeats every other alternative in
pairwise comparison, this alternative must be chosen and it is called a Condorcet
winner (Condorcet, 1788).
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Under the Borda Rule (Borda, 1781), weights are given to all the positions
of the alternatives in the individual preferences. For n alternatives, every voter
gives n points to his most preferred alternative, n − 1 points to his second
alternative, etc., and 1 point to his least preferred alternative. A decision is
made based on the total score of every alternative in a given voter profile.
Under Approval Voting (Brams and Fishburn, 1983), each voter divides the
alternatives into two classes: the alternatives he approves of and the ones he
disapproves of. Each time an alternative is approved of by a voter is good for
one point. The alternative chosen is the one that receives most points.
As becomes clear from Subsection 2.1, we propose a completely different proce-
dure. The point of departure for our model is a method proposed in Carlsson et
al. (1992), where the authors study the problem of formalizing consensus, within
a set of decision makers trying to agree on a mutual decision. Convergence to
consensus depends on the willingness of the decision makers to compromise. In
the present paper, we formulate a consensus model for decision-making in com-
mittees. Each decision maker evaluates each alternative with respect to certain
criteria, agreed upon in advance. Based on the evaluations of all alternatives by
all decision makers, the ‘distances’ between decision makers, and next a gener-
alized consensus degree, are calculated. If the generalized consensus degree is
smaller than a certain required one, the procedure of consensus reaching starts
in which at least one decision maker is asked to adjust his preferences.
The consensus model presented in this paper is much richer and more precise
than the election mechanisms from social choice theory. The profiles consisting
of the individual rankings of the alternatives are a by-product of our more
detailed and more sophisticated evaluations fi(a) of the different alternatives
a by individual i. For each i one can derive the ranking of the alternatives
by individual i from the evaluations fi(a), but not conversely. In going from
the evaluations to the individual ordering a lot of information is lost. The
evaluations are with respect to given criteria, which may have different weights.
The evaluations fi(a) are based on the weights hi(c) of the given criteria c
and on the values gi(c, a) of alternative a to decision maker i with respect to
the different criteria c. In order to determine the weights hi(c) and the values
gi(c, a) one may use the MacBeth software, which is very user-friendly. Since so
much information is lost when going from the evaluations fi(a) to the individual
orderings of the alternatives it is no surprise that different election mechanisms
applied to these individual rankings give different outcomes.
Another added value of our model is that, contrary to the other ‘static’
methods, it is dynamic, giving voters a chance to adjust their preferences. There
is a lot of room for negotiations here which makes our model very appropriate
for practical applications. It seems much harder to apply the game theoretic
approaches mentioned earlier to practical situations.
As mentioned before, our model is different from the methods proposed in
the literature, in particular, from the approach presented in Peleg (1984). In
particular, our consensus outcome is not determined by a set of winning coali-
tions. Nevertheless, one should notice that given a (sub)set of decision makers
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who manage to reach consensus, and given their final (adjusted) preferences,
the consensus outcome is undominated in the sense that there is no alternative
which is strongly preferred to the consensus outcome by all decision makers in
question.
3 The example
In this section, we present an application of the consensus model to an EU
COST Action activity. Suppose that the Management Committee (MC) of the
COST Action has to choose candidates for a grant for a ‘Short Term Scientific
Mission’ (STSM). We consider a small MC, consisting of only five members, i.e.,
N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
Suppose there are two grants to be assigned, but four applicants, i.e.,
A = {a1, a2, a3, a4}.
Each MC member will evaluate each applicant with respect to three criteria.
We have
C = {c1, c2, c3},
where
c1 is the quality of the detailed work plan,
c2 is the relevance of the STSM proposal to the COST Action and to the research
conducted by the host group, and
c3 is the quality of the CV of the applicant.
The majority degree is assumed to be m˜ = 3, i.e., at least three out of five
MC members may make a decision. Since the STSM grants are very attractive
to junior researchers, the MC wants to be rather unanimous in choosing the
candidates, and the required consensus degree is δ˜ = 0.95. If more than two
applicants are chosen by our consensus method, then we propose the chairman
to choose only two of them.
The relative weights that the different MC members attach to the criteria
c1, c2, c3 are as follows:
h1 = (0.4, 0.3, 0.3), h2 = (0.4, 0.4, 0.2), h3 = (0.1, 0.1, 0.8),
h4 = (0.4, 0.2, 0.4), h5 = (0.2, 0.6, 0.2).
MC member 3, for instance, seems to be the most ‘extreme’ in his opinion about
the importance of the criteria: when evaluating the applicants, he focuses mainly
on the applicant’s CV, and does not pay too much attention to the work plan
nor to the relevance of the proposal to the Cost Action and to the research of
the host group. In decision maker 5’s opinion, the latter is the most important
criterion when evaluating the applicants, etc.
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Moreover, we assume that
(g1(c, a))c∈C,a∈A =
 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.20.1 0.2 0.4 0.3
0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1

(g2(c, a))c∈C,a∈A =
 0.35 0.25 0.2 0.20.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.2 0.5 0.2 0.1

(g3(c, a))c∈C,a∈A =
 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.20.2 0.1 0.2 0.5
0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1

(g4(c, a))c∈C,a∈A =
 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.250.1 0.2 0.5 0.2
0.25 0.35 0.2 0.2

(g5(c, a))c∈C,a∈A =
 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.20.5 0.1 0.2 0.2
0.5 0.2 0.1 0.2
 .
Hence, by virtue of (3), the MC members’ evaluations of the applicants are as
follows:
(f1(a))a∈A = (0.26, 0.24, 0.3, 0.2), (f2(a))a∈A = (0.28, 0.3, 0.22, 0.2),
(f3(a))a∈A = (0.29, 0.37, 0.19, 0.15), (f4(a))a∈A = (0.22, 0.28, 0.28, 0.22),
(f5(a))a∈A = (0.46, 0.14, 0.2, 0.2).
Table 1 presents the distances between the MC members.
Table 1: Distances d(fi, fj), where i, j ∈ N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
1 2 3 4 5
1 0.051 0.09 0.0316 0.1225
2 0.051 0.0458 0.0447 0.1208
3 0.09 0.0458 0.0806 0.1453
4 0.0316 0.0447 0.0806 0.1449
5 0.1225 0.1208 0.1453 0.1449
Hence, we get
d∗ = d(f3, f5) = 0.1453, D∗ = {3, 5}.
One of the MC members fromD∗ will be asked to change his/her preferences. In
order to find out which one, we calculate d∗ when decision maker 3 is removed,
and d∗ when decision maker 5 is removed. Table 2 presents the distances between
the MC members when 3 is removed, and Table 3 presents the distances when
5 is removed.
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Table 2: Distances d(fi, fj), where i, j ∈ N = {1, 2, 4, 5}.
1 2 4 5
1 0.051 0.0316 0.1225
2 0.051 0.0447 0.1208
4 0.0316 0.0447 0.1449
5 0.1225 0.1208 0.1449
Table 3: Distances d(fi, fj), where i, j ∈ N = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
1 2 3 4
1 0.051 0.09 0.0316
2 0.051 0.0458 0.0447
3 0.09 0.0458 0.0806
4 0.0316 0.0447 0.0806
Hence,
d∗−3 = d(f4, f5) = 0.1449, d
∗
−5 = d(f1, f3) = 0.09.
Therefore, it is decision maker 5 who is asked to change his preferences, i.e.,
i∗ = 5.
Suppose that decision maker 5 announces that he will not change his preferences
at all, and hence, the MC decides to exclude him from further discussion. Now,
only decision makers 1, 2, 3, and 4 try to reach consensus. We have then
d′∗ = 0.09, D′∗ = {1, 3},
and moreover,
d′∗−1 = 0.0806, d
′∗
−3 = 0.051,
which gives
i′∗ = 3.
Hence, decision maker 3 is asked to change his preferences. Let us suppose that
he is very cooperative, and agrees to follow the chairman’s advice. Assume his
new preferences are as follows:
h′3 = (0.3, 0.3, 0.4)
(g′3(c, a))c∈C,a∈A =
 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.20.2 0.1 0.3 0.4
0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1

and consequently, decision maker 3’s new evaluations are
(f ′3(a))a∈A = (0.27, 0.28, 0.23, 0.22).
Table 4 shows the distances between decision makers from the set {1, 2, 3, 4}
after 3 adjusted his preferences.
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Table 4: Distances d(f ′i , f ′j), where i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, and
f ′i = fi for i ∈ {1, 2, 4}.
1 2 3 4
1 0.051 0.0418 0.0316
2 0.051 0.0158 0.0447
3 0.0418 0.0158 0.0354
4 0.0316 0.0447 0.0354
We have then
d′′∗ = 0.051, D′′∗ = {1, 2}, d′′∗−1 = 0.0447, d′′∗−2 = 0.0418,
and hence decision maker 2 is asked to change his preferences, i.e.,
i′′∗ = 2.
Decision maker 2 would be willing, in principle, to adjust his preferences. Nev-
ertheless, since he can see that even without him a decision will be made, he
refuses to change his preferences. In this situation, that is, with decision maker
2 removed, we have
m = 3 ≥ m˜, d′′′∗ = 0.0418, δ′′′∗ = 0.9582 > 0.95 = δ˜,
and therefore MC members 1, 3, and 4 reach consensus. In order to choose two
candidates, they calculate the total values of the candidates. The MC decides
to treat all the members equally, that is, for k = 1, 2, 3, 4 we have
f(ak) =
1
3
f1(ak) +
1
3
f ′3(ak) +
1
3
f4(ak).
Hence,
f(a1) =
0.75
3
, f(a2) =
0.8
3
, f(a3) =
0.81
3
, f(a4) =
0.64
3
and choosing two candidates with the greatest total value, the MC members
propose to give the STSM grants to candidates a2 and a3.
Next, let us see what the outcome would be if we apply different voting rules
to the profile consisting of the individual rankings (of the alternatives) derived
from the evaluations (fi(a))a∈A.
From the evaluations (fi(a))a∈A for i ∈ N one can derive the following
profile, in which ∼i denotes the indifference relation of decision maker i ∈ N .
1: a3 a1 a2 a4
2: a2 a1 a3 a4
3: a2 a1 a3 a4
4: a2 ∼4 a3 a1 ∼4 a4
5: a1 a3 ∼5 a4 a2
10
Which alternatives will be chosen by the Plurality Rule? Since a2 is mentioned
three times as the first preference, a3 is mentioned two times as the first prefer-
ence, a1 only once, while a4 is the first preference of no decision maker, under
the Plurality Rule the Management Committee which has to choose two alter-
natives, will decide for candidates a2 and a3. In this example, the result under
the Plurality Rule coincides with the result under our procedure of consensus
reaching.
When applying the Majority Rule to our example, no winner may be selected.
First of all, a4 is defeated by all remaining alternatives, alternative a2 defeats
a1, a1 defeats a3, while a2 does NOT defeat a3.
Next, let us apply the Borda Rule. For equally preferred alternatives we give
an average number of points. Table 5 shows the results of applying this rule.
Table 5: Applying the Borda Rule
i ∈ N→ 1 2 3 4 5 ∑
a ∈ A↓
a1 3 3 3 1,5 4 14,5
a2 2 4 4 3,5 1 14,5
a3 4 2 2 3,5 2,5 14
a4 1 1 1 1,5 2,5 7
Hence, candidates a1 and a2 are chosen under the Borda Rule.
If every decision maker i approves an alternative a if fi(a) ≥ 0.25, then
the outcome under Approval Voting is the ordering a1a2a3 and the committee,
faced with having to choose only two alternatives, will choose a1 and a2. If an
alternative a is approved of by agent i if fi(a) ≥ 0.3, then the outcome under
Approval Voting will be a2(a1a3) – where a2(a1a3) denotes that the committee
is indifferent with respect to a1 and a3 – and the committee will choose a2 and
a1 or a2 and a3, depending on the choice of the chairman.
4 Conclusion
In the present paper, we propose a method for a committee to choose an alter-
native from a set of alternatives. All alternatives are evaluated by each member
of the committee with respect to given criteria, which for each agent may have
different weights. The model is dynamic: the preferences of the decision mak-
ers do not have to be constant, but they may be adjusted during the process
of consensus reaching, each agent taking into account arguments of the other
committee members.
Our consensus approach compares favorably with the voting rules known
from social choice theory, because much more detailed and sophisticated infor-
mation is used, resulting in an outcome that does not depend on the applied
voting rule. It also compares favorably with the game-theoretic treatments,
because it is conceptually simpler and can be applied in practice more easily.
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We suggest to use the MacBeth software (www.m-macbeth.com; Bana e
Costa and Vansnick, 1999; Bana e Costa et al., 2003) for determining for every
agent i the weights hi(c) of the given criteria c and the values gi(c, a) of the
different alternatives a with respect to a given criterium c. MacBeth stands for
‘Measuring Attractiveness by a Categorical Based Evaluation Technique’. Based
on semantic judgements concerning the attractiveness of available alternatives,
it is an interactive approach to quantify the attractiveness of each alternative,
in such a way that the measurement scale constructed is an interval scale. The
Macbeth software is a very user-friendly tool for measuring attractiveness of
alternatives: it checks the consistency of the initial evaluations, and in case of
any inconsistency it indicates to the user what is the cause of the inconsistency
and how to improve on it in order to reach consistency. In Roubens et al. (2005),
the MacBeth technique is applied to a certain model of coalition formation. The
Macbeth software appeared to be very helpful in determining the utilities (the
values) of governments to parties.
The notion of absolute judgement has also been used in Saaty’s Analyti-
cal Hierarchy Process (AHP). The AHP method is described in Saaty (1977,
1980). There are fundamental differences between MacBeth and AHP. In par-
ticular, in the MacBeth approach, the absolute judgements concern differences
of attractiveness, whereas in Saaty’s method they concern ratios of priority, or
of importance. For a critical analysis of the AHP method, see Bana e Costa
and Vansnick (2001), where the authors show some inconsistencies of Saaty’s
method.
Topics for further research on the consensus model are incorporating the
possibility of tacit coalitions among the committee members and incorporating
data which may be stochastically uncertain, imprecise or colored in unknown
ways.
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